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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [ac
Tax Problems Incident To the Acquisition of Real Estate
II
DETERMINING AND ALLOCATING "COST" AND PRORATING
PROPERTY TAXES
Warren E. Hacker
DETERMINATION OF THE "COST" OF THE ACQUIRED PROPERTY
Generally, where property is acquired in a transaction upon which
either gain or loss is not recognized, its basis is determined in the first
instance by its basis in the hands of the other party to the transac-
tion,1 or by the basis to the taxpayer of the property given up in ex-
change therefor.2 Such acquisitions are here put to one side and only
the basis of property acquired
in transactions upon which
THE AUTHOR (A.B., 1937, Ohio University, gain or loss is recognized in
LL.B., 1940, Harvard) is a Cleveland attorney full are considered. In such
and a member, Tax Institute Committee,
Cleveland Bar Association. cases, "basis" is "cost" to the
taxpayer.3  Curiously, how-
ever, the term "cost" is not
defined by the statute and is defined with no particularity by the
regulations. Here examined are the kind of items which are included
in the cost of property; the kind of items which do not add to cost but
which are currently deductible; and the circumstances under which
certain items of the latter kind may, at the taxpayer's election, be
added to cost.
Items Adding to Cost
Cost, of course, includes the consideration to the seller paid or in-
curred by the purchaser. It thus includes the amount of money paid
and the property (usually at fair market value4) transferred to the
1. See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 334(b) (1), 362(a),(b).
2. See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 358(a), 1031(d), 1033(c).
3. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1012.
4. Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1 (1957), as amended, T.D. 6311, 1958-2 CUM. BULL. 394,
states merely that "cost is the amount paid ... in cash or other property." Under § 1001 (b)
of the code, gain or loss on the property transferred by each party is measured by the money
plus the "fair market value" of the property received. It will usually be presumed that the
value of the consideration transferred equals the value of that received in an arm's-length
transaction. Therefore, generally each party's cost for the property received will exactly cor-
respond with the value of that property at that time. It may seriously be questioned whether
by agreement the parties can avoid this by assigning fictitiously high or low prices to the
property involved where property is acquired for property or for cash and property. See dis-
cussion, pp. 166-67.
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seller for the property. In cases where the consideration includes
the purchasing corporation's own stock, the fair market value5 of such
shares is included in the cost of the property, whether or not the
stock represents an original issue or treasury shares." Cost includes
the principal amount of any indebtedness to the seller incurred by the
purchaser on the acquisition. It also includes indebtedness which
antedates the purchase and which is assumed by the purchaser, or
subject to which the property is acquired." In addition to the familiar
example of principal mortgage indebtedness, this category includes
such items as property taxes for years prior to the year of purchase, 8
special assessments which accrued prior to purchase, and interest or
penalties on any of the foregoing accrued prior to the purchase.
Such indebtedness and pre-existing liabilities add to cost, even though
the purchaser uses the cash rather than accrual method of accounting,
whether or not the purchaser is personally liable therefor, and
whether or not it represents a lien on the property.
In addition, cost of the property includes commissions and finders'
fees, if any, paid or incurred by the purchaser, together with other
costs of obtaining, perfecting, and assuring title or quiet possession of
the property, which are paid or incurred by the purchaser. Thus,
attorneys' fees, the costs of surveying the property, title search and
title insurance, and recording fees all add to the property's cost and
are hence not currently deductible. 10
Generally, a loss is sustained upon removal or demolition of
buildings which is measured by their adjusted basis. Where, how-
ever, land and buildings are acquired with the intention of removing
the buildings, no loss is sustained thereby. Moreover, no deduction
is allowed for the expense of removal, and the entire purchase price
for both land and buildings, together with the costs of removal, is
treated as cost of the land only.1 This is a realistic approach where
the intention to remove existed at the time of purchase. In such
5. 3A MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL INcoME TAxATION, S 21.25, n. 38 (2d ed. 1954).
6. This assumes, as stated at the outset, that the transaction is taxable, e.g., not within §§
351 or 362. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1032-1(d) (1956). The corporation realizes neither gain
nor loss on the disposition of its own shares. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1032 (a).
7. United States v. Headier, 303 U.S. 564 (1938), rehearing denied, 304 U.S. 588 (1938)
(debt assumed); Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947) (property acquired subject to
debt).
8. Taxes for the year of purchase must be prorated. See discussion of § 164 (d), pp. 171-75.
9. A later compromise or reduction in such pre-existing liabilities does not reduce the cost
(Blackstone Theatre Co., 12 T.C. 801 (1949)), but may give rise to taxable income. See
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 61(a) (12), 108; Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12 (1957).
10. E.g., Millinery Center Bldg. Corp., 21 T.C. 817 (1954), rerd on other grounds, 221
F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1955), a fd, 350 U.S. 456 (1956) (attorneys' fees); Warner Mountains
Lumber Co., 9 T.C. 1171 (1947), acq., 1948-2 CUm. BULL. 4 (title examination); Vincent
Johnson, 24 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 819 (1955) (survey costs). See generally 4 MERTENS, LAW
OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION, § 25.25 (2d ed. 1954).
11. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3 (1960). Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 10 P-H B.T.A. Mem.
1344 (1941).
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cases, the purchaser's intention is to obtain the land; the buildings are
acquired only because they were located on the land.'2 Clearing the
land of the unwanted buildings is no different from clearing the land
of other obstructions to its intended use. Where, however, the pur-
chaser's immediate purpose is to acquire and hold both land and
buildings, a later change in that intention does not bring this principle
into play.13
One other peculiar rule having particular application in this area
should be mentioned. Such recurring items as painting, and roof,
floor, plumbing, and electrical maintenance and repairs, are usually
treated as currently deductible expenses. 4 However, such expendi-
tures, if undertaken as part of a general rehabilitation program, may
be held to be additions to the cost of the property and not currently
deductible.' 5 The risk of this principle's being applied is greatly in-
creased where the rehabilitation program occurs shortly after pur-
chase because it then may be regarded as, in effect, maintenance
which the seller neglected or deferred, a matter presumably reflected
in the property's having been purchased at a price lower than it oth-
erwise would have been.1
6
Certain local benefit assessments also add to the cost of the prop-
erty and are nondeductible.' 7  Street paving and lighting, sewer, side-
walk, and other taxes assessed against local benefits, imposed because
of, and measured by, some benefit accruing directly to the property, are
not deductible as taxes.' 8 The theory is that such items are as much
a cost of improving the property as if the owner himself had made
12. Another instance of where the purchaser's intention prevails over the form of the transac-
tion is where he purchases stock of a corporation in order to obtain its assets through liquida-
tion (Georgia Properties Co. v. Henslee, 138 F. Supp. 587 (M.D. Tenn. 1955); Montana-Da-
kota Utilities Co., 25 T.C. 408 (1955); Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co., 14 T.C. 74 (1950),
aft'd, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 847 (1951)), or other distribution
(Hogg v. Allen, 214 F.2d 640 (5th Cir. 1954); Charles A. Clark, 19 T.C. 48 (1952); West-
ern Wine & Liquor Co., 18 T.C. 1090 (1952)), or to accomplish other purposes (Pressed
Steel Car Co., 20 T.C. 198 (1953), acq., 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 8). Cf. Gulftex Drug Co., 29
T.C. 118 (1957), aff'd, 261 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1958).
13. Ingle v. Gage, 52 F.2d 738 (W.D.N.Y. 1931); I.T. 3311, 1939-2 CuM. BuLL. 206;
0. Maples, 25 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 921 (1956); Parma Co., 18 B.T.A. 429 (1929), acq.,
IX-1 CuM. BULL. 42 (1930). However, where the buildings are later razed to permit con-
struction of a new building, the remaining cost of the old building may be treated as part of
the cost of the new building. Commissioner v. Appleby, 123 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1941). Treas.
Reg. § 1.165-3(b) (1) (1960) allow a loss even in such a case.
14. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4 (1958).
15. Ethyl M. Cox, 17 T.C. 1287 (1952); Home News Publishing Co., 18 B.T.A. 1008
(1930).
16. The fairness of the principle can be questioned where the expenditures merely represent
deferred maintenance of the same taxpayer. The principle makes considerably more sense
where the items represent lack of ordinary maintenance by the predecessor owner.
17. INT. REV. CoDE oF 1954, § 164(b) (5).
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.164-4(a) (1957). The tax is considered assessed against local benefits
when the property taxed is limited to the property benefited. Ibid.
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the improvement. Accordingly, they are a proper addition to the
cost of the property."
Items Currently Deductible
On the other hand, local benefit assessments, to the extent they
can be shown to represent maintenance and repair of the improve-
ments or interest charges with respect to such improvements, are de-
ductible currently as taxes.20 As usual, the burden is on the taxpayer
and if the proper allocation cannot be shown, no part of the assess-
ment is deductible.2' In addition, special assessments. levied by spe-
cial taxing districts are deductible if: (a) the district covers at least
all of one county, (b) at least 1,000 persons are subject to the assess-
ment, and (c) the tax is assessed annually at a uniform rate on the
same assessed values as are used for the real property tax generally.-2
None of the assessments of special taxing districts in Ohio presently
meet these tests.23
A special problem arises with respect to federal and state taxes
incident to the acquisition, development, and construction of property.
The code24 specifically denies deduction - as a tax - for all federal
excise taxes, but permits them to be deducted as ordinary and neces-
sary expenses. The wages paid in connection with the construction of
an improvement are treated as part of the cost of the property, not
as ordinary and necessary expense. Still, the social security and other
federal employment taxes, imposed upon the employer and measured
by such wages, are allowed as current deductions and are not required
to be capitalized.25
Similarly, the Ohio sales and use taxes paid or incurred on the
purchase of tangible personal property, including construction ma-
terials for improvements to real estate, are deductible as taxes and
do not add to the cost of capital items.26 These taxes are imposed
upon and, hence, are deductible only by the "consumer" as defined by
19. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1016(a) (1); Treas. Reg. § 1.1016-2(a) (1957).
20. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 164(b) (5) (A).
21. Treas. Reg. § 1.164-4(b) (1) (1957).
22. INT. REV. CODB OF 1954, § 164(b) (5) (B); Treas. Reg. § 1.164-4(b) (2) (1957).
23. Such multi-county taxing districts (e.g., conservancy and flood control districts) in Ohio
assess the tax in accordance with formulae which attempt to vary the burden according to the
benefit conferred and, hence, not "at a uniform rate' on the assessed values. See generally
A.R.RL 3111, 11-2 Cum. BuLL. 111 (1923); Champion Coated Paper Co., 10 B.T.A. 433
(1928).
24. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 164(b) (3).
25. IL A. Bryan, 32 T.C. No. 10 (Apr. 16, 1959); Joe W. Stout, 31 T.C. No. 124 (Mar. 25,
1959). Treas. Reg. § 1.266-1(b) (2) (1958), as originally adopted, contained a provision
indicating that the Commissioner would treat such taxes as capital items, not expenses, where
incurred in connection with construction or development of property. This regulation has re-
cendy been amended to eliminate that provision by T.D. 6380, 1959 INT. REV. BULL. No. 12,
at 25. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.164-3 (1957).
26. Rev. Rul. 267, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 23 (Ohio sales tax).
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the local statute." Thus, if a landowner purchases materials to be
used in construction of improvements to real estate, he thereby incurs
the tax and may deduct it. If, on the other hand, the land owner con-
tracts for the improvements, his contractor will be the consumer of
such materials. In such cases it is not a tax of the land owner and
may not be deducted by him, even though he will undoubtedly bear
the economic burden of the tax in the price paid for the improve-
ments.28 Prior to the 1959 amendments to the Ohio sales and use
tax, 9 this result could be avoided and the landowner assured of
the deduction simply by a separate statement of the cost of ma-
terials entering into the real estate improvement, either in the con-
tract or in the billing. Under the present law, this is no longer pos-
sible.30 The Ohio sales and use tax on materials purchased by the
contractor will now be part of the cost of the structure or improve-
ment. The Ohio General Assembly has thus unwittingly deprived
Ohio landowners of a federal income tax deduction for Ohio sales
and use taxes incident to the construction of land improvements, ex-
cept in instances where the landowner himself makes the purchases
of the necessary materials.31
Election to Capitalize Taxes and Carrying Charges
In some instances, e.g., where current deduction would not be of
benefit, the taxpayer may prefer not to deduct some or all of his cur-
rently deductible items, but to add them to his cost of the property.
This is permitted, to a limited extent, at the election of the tax-
32payer. The type of items as to which this election is permitted and
the effect of the election vary depending upon the class of property
involved.
27. I.T. 2882, XIV-1 CUM. BuLL. 64 (1935) (Ohio sales tax); I.T. 3938, 1949-1 CuM.
BULL. 59 (Ohio use tax).
28. See I.T. 3909, 1948-1 CUM. BuLL. 34. Taxes generally are deductible only by the per-
son upon whom imposed. Treas. Reg. § 1.164.1 (1957). See also Biddle v. Commissioner,
302 U.S. 573 (1938).
29. Amended Sub. S.B. No. 376, 103d General Assembly of Ohio (1959).
30. OHIo REv. CODE § 5739.01 (B) now provides that a construction contract pursuant to
which tangible personal property is, or is to be, incorporated into a structure, or improvements
on and becoming a part of real property is not a sale of such personalty and the construction
contractor is the consumer thereof.
31. It is possible that the landowner may obtain the Ohio sales and use tax deduction by
authorizing the contractor in advance to purchase the necessary materials for, and on behalf of,
the landowner, thus, in effect, making the contractor his purchasing agent. A similar pro-
cedure was used by the Defense Plant Corporation and similar governmental agencies during
World War II and was recognized by the Ohio Department of Taxation as effective to make
the governmental agency the "consumer," thus exempting the purchases from Ohio sales and
use tax. Cf. Midwest Hauler's Inc. v. Glander, 150 Ohio St. 402, 83 N.E.2d 53 (1948).
However, in such cases, the landowner, as principal, must be willing to accept the risk of being
bound by the commitments made by his agent beyond his actual, but within his apparent, au-
thority. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 159 (1958).
32. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 266. Section 1016(a) (1) requires adjustment to basis for
items properly chargeable to capital account. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1016-2 (c) (1957).
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(a) If it is unimproved and unproductive real property, the election
may cover only annual taxes, interest, and other carrying charges.P
(b) If it is real property, whether improved or unimproved, productive
or unproductive, the election may cover interest, taxes, and otherwise
deductible expenses of any kind paid or incurred in development, con-
structon, or additions to construction prior to completion of the project.3 4
(c) If it is personal property, the election may include employer
taxes on compensation paid or incurred for transporting and installing;
interest on loans incurred to purchase, transport, or install; and sales and
use -taxes.8 5
In the case of unimproved and unproductive real estate, a new elec-
tion may be made annually; but in the other two, the election, once
made, is binding upon the taxpayer until the project or installation is
completed."'
The taxpayer is given considerable latitude in making this elec-
tion. He may elect to capitalize items relating to one project and not
to others." And even as to a single project, he may elect to capital-
ize certain of the items but deduct currently other items as to which
the election is permitted.3 8 Here again, no particular form is pre-
scribed for the election. It is simply made by attaching a statement
to the return indicating the item or items and project or projects
covered by the election.3 9
ALLOCATING COST
Having determined the cost, the problem then arises as to how
it should be allocated among the several assets acquired. Where the
assets are purchased in separate transactions, i.e., from different per-
sons or at different times, the problems here considered do not arise.
Cost can, and must, be separately determined for each separate prop-
erty in such cases. But where several assets are purchased from the
same person at the same time, it frequently becomes necessary to de-
termine the separate cost of each.
The most common examples are (1) the allocation of cost be-
tween depreciable and nondepreciable assets after a lump-sum pur-
33. Treas. Reg. § 1.266-1(a) (1) (i) (1958).
34. Treas. Reg. § 1.266-1 (b) (1) (ii) (1958).
35. Treas. Reg. § 1.266-1 (b) (1) (iii) (1958).
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.266-1 (c) (2) (1958).
37. Treas. Reg. § 1.266-1 (c) (1) (1958).
38. Ibid. Where an item (e.g., salary of a corporate officer during the construction of a
building) relates in part to such project and in part to ordinary activities, the item must be
allocated between them in some equitable fashion and only that allocated to the former is sub-
ject to the election. Treas. Reg. § 1.266-1 (e) (1958).
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.266-1 (c) (3) (1958).
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chase of land, buildings, and appurtenant personal property, and (2)
the allocation of cost between the portion of land disposed of and
that retained where purchased as a single tract. The problem of al-
locating cost among the several assets or segments should be distin-
guished from that of resolving a lump sum into several elements -
e.g., determining whether an amount paid or received includes inter-
est as well as principal in absence of designation.40 In the latter case,
the question is whether such an element exists in the absence of ex-
press agreement or designation. In the type of cases herein con-
sidered, the several elements (i.e., the several kinds of property ac-
quired) clearly exist and the problem is to determine the proper
amount included for each in the lump-sum price paid.
From the purchaser's point of view, it is generally desirable that
as much of the cost as possible be allocated to ordinary deduction
items (such as buildings and equipment) as contrasted with the land
and other nondepreciable items; and that as much of the cost as pos-
sible be allocated to depreciable assets having relatively short lives as
contrasted with the building proper. From the viewpoint of the
seller, the optimum tax result may or may not coincide with these
desires of the purchaser.4 Thus, the allocation made, whether nego-
tiated as part of the agreement or made in the absence of an agreed
allocation, may involve a delicate balance of tax considerations be-
tween the seller and the purchaser.
Where Price Is Not Allocated by Agreement
In the absence of an agreed allocation of the price among the sev-
eral assets or classes of assets involved in the transaction, some equit-
able allocation must be made. Where, as sometimes occurs, an allo-
cation which is beneficial in a tax sense to the purchaser involves a
tax detriment to the seller,42 the allocation must, in the absence of
40. See Estate of Jacob Resler, 17 T.C. 1085 (1952), acq., 1952-1 CuM. BULL. 3. Prior to
1954, the taxpayers who purchased property on the installment plan were denied interest de-
ductions even though the "time price" clearly included an interest element. See, e.g., Henrietta
Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner, 52 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1931); Daniel Bros. v. Commissioner,
28 F.2d 761 (5th Cir. 1928). This is now remedied in certain instances by § 163(b), which
presumes that such arrangements include interest at 6 per cent per annum.
41. In many instances, the allocation will be of no concern to the seller. If not a dealer, he
is entitled to capital gain treatment for gain and ordinary loss treatment for loss on sale of both
depreciable assets and real property used in trade or business which has been held for more than
6 months. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1231. If he is a dealer, he has ordinary gain or or-
dinary loss on both land and buildings. See discussion p. 255.
42. When the purchase agreement includes not only property, but also the seller's covenant
not to compete for a limited period, the amount allocated to that covenant is ordinary income
to the seller (Hamlin's Trust v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1954) ), but may be
amortized by the purchaser ratably over the period (Commissioner v. Gazette Telegraph, 209
F.2d 526 (10th Cir. 1954)). To the extent that the lump-sum price is allocated to the prop-
erty instead of the covenant, the seller could have capital gain and the purchaser simply an
increased capital cost. See note 41 suara.
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agreed allocation, yield even-handed justice to both sides of the trans-
action. Generally, therefore, the price in such cases is allocated in
the ratio which the fair market value of each asset or class of assets
bears to the total fair market value of all the assets purchased. 3 In
view of the frequency with which this problem arises, and the almost
universal use by the Internal Revenue Service of this allocation
method, it is curious that it has not long since been incorporated into
the regulations as a rule of general application. 44
The rule is deceptively simple. Determining "fair market value"
is more frequently difficult than easy. There is a hard core of truth
in Judge Learned Hand's observation that "fair market value is not
nearly so universal a phenomenon" as the Internal Revenue Service
would have us believe.45 Yet, the application of an equally elusive
concept, as it relates to real property, is required and accepted as a
matter of course in the assessment of real property taxes. Thus, in
the absence of better evidence, the relative assessed values for real
estate tax purposes are used as the basis of allocating cost between
land and buildings.4 In the absence of better evidence, the original
cost may be allocated among the several properties in the ratio of
their selling prices 47 where the properties are later sold. The best
evidence is, of course, the price at which the property has been sold
in an arm's-length transaction. It is the lack of such evidence which
gives rise to the problem here discussed. In such instances, there-
fore, the best evidence is an appraisal of the several assets made by
qualified independent experts at or about the time of the purchase.
In any case which involves substantial sums or the likelihood of later
dispute with the Internal Revenue Service, it would appear advisable
for the taxpayer to cause such appraisals to be made as the basis for
allocating his cost among the several assets or classes of assets.4
43. Watson v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 544 (1953); Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570,
572 (2d Cir. 1945); C. D. Johnson Lumber Corp., 12 T.C. 348 (1949). See also excellent
Note, Considerations it; Applying the Rule of Williams versus McGowan, 13 TAX L REv.
369 (1958).
44. See, eg., particular applications of this allocation method in Treas. Reg. § 1.61-6(a)
(1957) Example 2 (sale of part of a larger property); Treas. Reg. § 1.307-1(a) (1955)
(allocation of basis between old and new shares after stock dividend); Treas. Reg. 5 1.358-2
(1955) (allocation of basis among stock or securities received in nontaxable exchanges);
Treas. Reg. § 1-1031(d)-1 (c) (1956) and Example (allocation of basis among properties
received on a nontaxable "like kind" exchange). Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.1033 (c)-1 (B) (1957)
(allocation of basis among replacement property after involuntary conversion).
45. This learned comment was made in Helvering v. Walbridge, 70 F.2d 683, 684-88 (2d
Cir. 1934), in rejecting the dictum of the regulations that "only in rare and extraordinary
cases will property be considered to have no fair market value." Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1 (a)
(1957).
46. E.g., Joseph F. Climan, Jr., 16 B.T.A. 991 (1929); Barbara Konold, 9 B.T.A. 1194
(1928).
47. See, e.g., L M. Graves, 21 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 425 (1952).
48. Appraisals made at the time of the purchase, but in any event shortly after purchase and
before the matter becomes an issue, obviously will carry more weight with the Service and the
courts than one made some years later or after the Service has questioned the taxpayer's aloca-
1960]
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Where the Price Is Allocated by Agreement
Where the parties negotiate and agree upon the price for each
asset or class of assets involved in the transaction, there is, in con-
trast to the type of case described above, no problem of equitable
allocation. The seller and purchaser, dealing at arm's length, are
free to make their bargain and have made it. The question then is
the extent to which that agreed allocation forecloses the Internal
Revenue Service.
In some cases, the parties may be able to establish the prices for
the respective assets agreed upon by them, even though that alloca-
tion was not carried into the written contract. 49 Obviously, however,
it is far better to include this part of the understanding in the written
contract, if for no other reason than that it may avoid the expendi-
ture of time and money involved in possible dispute and litigation. It
is equally obvious that if the prices assigned bear some reasonable re-
lationship to relative fair market values, the chances of dispute are
greatly minimized. The touchy problems arise when, for whatever
reason, the allocation appears to be unrealistic in the eyes of the In-
ternal Revenue Service. This can occur either because the contract
allocation disregards certain valuable assets acquired by the purchaser
in the transaction, or because certain of the assets appear to have
been overpriced at the expense of others.
The first of these cases usually involves such intangibles as good-
will, trade name, or the like. Where such a nondepreciable intan-
gible exists and has value,50 the purchaser will, of course, wish to have
the contract provide for its transfer to him, but may insist that little
or none of the price be allocated to it. If the contract requires its
transfer to the purchaser but assigns no part of the price to it, the
Internal Revenue Service may require allocation of part of the price
to it. Frequently the result is more burdensome to the purchaser
than if a reasonable allocation had been made in the contract at the
outset. This leads to two practical suggestions: First, if the pur-
chaser believes in good faith that there is no such intangible value, or
in any event does not want it (e.g., because he is going to change the
character of the operation or the name under which it is carried on),
the contract should make clear the intention of the parties that the
purchaser is not acquiring any such intangibles. Equally important,
the purchaser should not use the trade name, customer lists, and the
like after the purchase since here, as elsewhere in life, actions speak
tion. In contrast, the appraisals made by the Service are, of necessity, almost invariably retro-
spective.
49. Bryant Heater Co. v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 938 (6th Cit. 1956); Lorenzo Zerillo, 25
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 758 (1956).
50. It is, of course, entirely possible for such real property as a hotel, motel, or office build-
ing to have goodwill apart from its physical attributes such as desirable location and arrange-
ment of space.
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louder than words. Secondly, if the purchaser does wish to acquire
such intangible assets, then the contract, in addition to covering their
transfer, should specify a portion of the price for them." In either
case, the purchaser should be prepared to show, if later inquiry is
made, that the price assigned to the physical assets purchased is rea-
sonable in all of the circumstances, leaving nothing additional to be
assigned to the intangibles 5 2
As noted above, allocation of price among the assets purchased in
relation to their respective fair market values is less likely to attract
difficulties. But it is not essential that the allocation by the parties
be strictly in relation to fair market values for the allocation to be
reasonable. Some latitude is allowed. However, where the prices
assigned to the several assets have been obviously distorted to suit the
purchaser's tax situation, the Internal Revenue Service may well be
sustained in reallocating the purchaser's cost on a more realistic basis.
Generally, such an obvious distortion arises only where the allocation
of price in the agreement is a matter of relative indifference to the
seller and, accordingly, where it cannot be said that this portion of
the agreement was really the result of arm's-length bargaining. On
the other hand, where the allocation agreed upon resulted in a tax ad-
vantage to the purchaser with a correlative tax disadvantage to the
seller, the Commissioner should not be at liberty to remake the trans-
action and thereby deprive the purchaser of the benefit for which he
bargained and possibly paid.
Unfortunately, the law to date is not that clear - even where the
allocation of price resulted from arm's-length bargaining. 8  If the
allocation made in the contract appears to be unrealistic, there is no
certainty of its being sustained against an attack by the Commis-
sioner.54
51. In Fraser v. Nauts, 8 F.2d 106 (N.D. Ohio 1925), the purchaser, interested in acquiring
lumber and warehouse space, purchased a lumber business for $525,000 under a contract which
allocated $250,000 to the lumber and $100,000 to goodwill for which the seller had a basis
of $102,000. The Commissioner allocated the whole amount to lumber, but the court held
the seller had the right to fix values, high or low, on the lumber and other assets "as an induce-
ment to obtain a market for his less salable goodwill." Assuming that there was in fact good-
will having some substantial value at the time of the sale, and that the allocation was a matter
of arms-length bargaining, this decision seems correct. The purchaser's intention is not of
significance in determining the seller's tax consequences. Compare Armored Tank Corp., 11
T.C. 644 (1948), acq., 1949-1 C.t BULL. 1 (sellers held to have sold stock) with Pressed
Steel Car Co., 20 T.C. 198 (1953), acq., 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 198 (cost of same stock held
deductible by purchaser where acquired for the purpose of settling litigation). But see sugges-
tion to the contrary in Note, Considerations in Applying the Rule of Williams v'ersus Mc-
Gowan, 13 TAx L. REV. 369, 378 n.41 (1958).
52. See note 47 supra.
53. Compare Iorenzo Zerillo, 25 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 758 (1956) with Particelli v. Commis-
sioner, 212 F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1954); and see cases discussed, note 42 supra.
54. See Semmel & Stern. Tax Effect of Form in the Acquisition of Assets, 63 YALE L.J. 765
775 (1954).
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PRORATION OF PROPERTY TAXES
For simplicity's sake, this discussion will be limited to the ap-
plication of federal income tax principles to transactions involving
Ohio taxes.
Ohio Real Property Taxes
The standard conveyancing practice in Ohio is for the real estate
taxes for the year of sale to be prorated to the date of transfer and
the economic burden of the taxes to be borne by the seller and pur-
chaser, respectively, in those proportions. Since 1954, a similar pro-
ration is required in determining, as between the parties, the deducti-
bility of such taxes for the year of sale55 as well as the effect, for fed-
eral income tax purposes, upon the amount of sale proceeds realized
by the seller56 and the purchaser's coft of the property.57 These pro-
visions cure in part - but only in part - certain inequities which ex-
isted under the prior law.
Deductibility for the Year of Purchase
As applied to Ohio transactions, there were two inequities. The
first arose from the general principle that a taxpayer may deduct only
such taxes as are imposed upon him or his property, and not those of
another.5 In Ohio, the real estate tax year is the calendar year;59
the owner has no personal liability for the tax,60 but it becomes a lien
on the property on January 1st of that year; 6 the tax valuation and
rate are not fixed and, therefore, the amount of tax for the year can-
not be known until after August lst; 62 and the tax is payable in full
between October 1st and December 20th, or may be paid half then
and the balance on or before June 20th of the following year. 3 In
actual practice, there is no county in which the tax can be paid as early
as October 1st. Thus, the tax always becomes a lien while the prop-
erty is in the hands of the seller; it frequently is undetermined and
undeterminable at the time of sale; and almost invariably it is payable
after the property has passed to the purchaser. Since in these circum-
stances the tax is regarded as imposed upon the seller, the purchaser
could never deduct any part of the tax for the year of purchase.64
55. Under INT. R.EV, CODE OF 1954, § 164(d).
56. Under INT. Rnv. CODE oF 1954, § 1001(b).
57. Under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1012.
58. See authorities cited, note 28 supra.
59. See 2 C. C. H. Ohio Tax Cas. 11, 861 (B. T. A. 1958).
60. OHIO REV. COD § 5719.01.
61. 1943 Ops. ATiry GEN. No. 5841 at 89 (Ohio).
62. OHIO REv. CODE §§ 319.28, .30.
63. Omo REV. CODE § 323.12, .17.
64. Magruder v. Supplee, 316 U.S. 394 (1942).
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The second inequity was that whether, and the extent to which, even
the seller could deduct the tax varied depending upon the facts. If
the seller used an accrual method of accounting, the entire amount of
the tax accrued and was deductible for the taxable year during which
the lien date fell,65 even though he never paid the tax and was reim-
bursed for part of it in the price received by him from the purchaser.
On the other hand, if the seller used the cash method of accounting,
he obtained no deduction unless he paid the tax; it was not payable
until after the sale; and it was somewhat doubtful whether an allow-
ance by him to the purchaser of an equivalent amount against the pur-
chase price was properly to be treated as payment of the tax.66 Be-
ginning with 1954, the code attempts to remedy both of these inequi-
ties.
Mandatory Proration of the Tax
The code now provides that the real property tax for the real
property tax year during which the property is sold must be prorated
between the seller and the purchaser to the date of sale and shall be
treated as though the tax were imposed upon them in those propor-
tions. 67  This proration is required regardless of whose tax it is un-
der local law and whether or not there is a proration of the economic
burden of the tax by agreement between the parties."' It is limited to
the real property taxes for the year of sale. It does not apply to
taxes for prior real property tax years, whether or not they are de-
linquent at the time of the sale. 9 Nor does it make deductible taxes
which are otherwise nondeductible.70 But it would seem that local
benefit assessments which are otherwise deductible for the year of
sale should be treated as real property taxes for this purpose. Un-
fortunately, this is not made clear by the regulations.
Another matter left in doubt by the code and regulations is
whether its application is limited to transactions which are strictly
"sales." The code, by its terms, applies only "if real property is sold
during any real property tax year . . . ." This, it would appear,
65. Walsh-McGuire Co. v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 983 (6th Cir. 1938); Rev. Rul. 152,
1955-1 Cum BULL. 67. Cf. election since 1954 to accrue real estate taxes ratably over the
real estate tax year under § 461 (c).
66. However, deduction was allowed a cash basis vendor for taxes paid by the vendee in Van
Dyke v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Wis. 1957); Norman Coolege 40 B.T.A. 1325
(1939), acq., 1940-1 Cum. BULL. 2. In both cases, the purchase price reflected the fact
that vendee would pay the taxes and the taxes were in fact paid. Deduction by vendor was
sustained on the theory that vendee had acted as an "agent" for payment of the taxes.
67. TrN. REv. COD OF 1954, § 164(d) (1). INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 164(b) (7)
denies deduction to one party to the extent that the tax is thus treated as imposed upon the
other.
68. Treas. Reg. § 1.164-6(c) (1959).
69. Treas. Reg. § 1.164-6(b) (2) (1959).
70. E.g., local benefit assessments made nondeductible by INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, 5
164(b) (5).
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clearly excludes transfers without consideration, such as gifts and con-
tributions.7 It is a closer question whether it also excludes "ex-
changes" of property. 2 Certainly where the transaction involves a
taxable transfer of real property for money and other property, 73 it
should be treated as "sold" for this purpose. It can hardly be be-
lieved that Congress intended the principle to operate only where the
sole consideration for the real property is money. 4 Where the trans-
action is an involuntary sale, 75 it is within the literal terms of the code
and, it would appear, the result does not depend upon whether or not
the taxpayer chooses to replace the property, or, having done so,
chooses to elect nonrecognition of gain.70  Thus, the principle applies
in at least some nontaxable transactions. This, then, leads to con-
jecture as to whether it applies to exchanges of real property solely
for other property, whether nontaxable7 7 or taxable.
Some argument can be made of the fact that at the same time
Congress enacted these rules governing deductibility of the tax for
the year "sold," it also enacted provisions governing the effect of this
tax proration upon the computation of the seller's proceeds of sale
and the purchaser's cost for the property. The first of these78 ex-
pressly deals with realization of gain or loss upon "sale or other dis-
position of property" and the other 79 does so indirectly. This is cer-
tainly some indication that at least exchanges and other dispositions
upon which gain or loss is recognized are within the term "sold."
There is already one case which states by way of dictum that this is
true for a transaction which, by statutory fiat, is treated as an "ex-
71. However, there appears to be no reason why the statute should not be amended to extend
the same principle to such transfers since, even in case of sale, there is no requirement that the
parties agree to share the economic burden of the tax. The same inequities exist where the
real property is transferred by gift or contribution, as where it is sold or exchanged.
72. Throughout the law, there appears to have been a careful and deliberate effort made to
distinguish between "sale," "exchange," and "other disposition." See e.g., INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, §§ 1001, 1011 ("sale or other disposition"); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1002 ("sale
or exchange"); and INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5§ 331, 351, 1031 ("exchange" only). "Sale"
has generally been regarded as a disposition for cash or its equivalent (e.g., Hale v. Helvering,
85 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1936) ), while "exchange" has been regarded as implying "reciprocal
transfers of capital assets" (Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 U.S. 247, 249
(1941)).
73. Liabilities assumed or subject to which the property is taken are regarded as "other
property" for other purposes. See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947); United States v.
Hendler, 303 U.S. 564 (1938).
74. But the Committee Reports are silent. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23,
196-98. This hardly justifies the silence of the regulations.
75. E.g., by mortgage foreclosure, sale for money under threat or imminence of condemna-
tion, or receipt of money awarded for property condemned.
76. Under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1033(a). See discussion, pp. 215-21.
77. Under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1031. See discussion, p. 209.
78. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1001(b).
79. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1012. This defines basis as "cost" and is thus limited to
acquisition in transactions upon which gain or loss was recognized.
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change." 8  It is doubtful whether the property is "sold" in other
transactions on which gain or loss is not recognized. If applied to
such transactions, the result under the provisions herein discussed
would, in some instances, actually be contrary to the result required
elsewhere in the code.
81
It seems certain that Congress, in attempting to remedy the in-
equities which existed under prior law, did not foresee these various
questions. It is to be hoped that the Internal Revenue Service is pre-
pared to recommend legislation to clarify these matters promptly. In
the meantime, and lacking guidance by appropriate regulations, tax-
payers are justified in requesting rulings from the Internal Revenue
Service whenever these questions arise."'
Constructive Payment of the Tax
In addition to requiring proration of the tax between the seller
and purchaser, the code provides the time when a cash basis pur-
chaser or seller is deemed to have paid the tax.83  Here, in sharp con-
trast, the regulations do not hesitate to fill gaps left in the statute.
A cash basis purchaser in Ohio is permitted to deduct the portion of
the real property tax prorated to, and treated as imposed upon him
(1) as though he had paid it on the date of sale, (2) on the date
when he thereafter actually pays the taxes, or (3) on the date
when he pays an "amount representing such tax . . . to the seller,
mortgagee, trustee or other person having an interest in the property
as security.""8  The same options are permitted by regulation to the
80. Simon J. Murphy Co. v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 639, 643 (6th Cir. 1956) (real estate
distributed in a taxable corporate liquidation under the 1939 Code). See INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 331 (a) which treats such liquidations as an "exchange." Rertite Bulletin, 6 CCH
1959 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 5 8769.
81. After certain types of intercorporate transactions upon which gain or loss is not recog-
nized, § 381 (c) (16) permits the acquiring corporation to deduct items of its predecessor the
obligation for which it has assumed, provided that the obligation was not "reflected in the
amount of stock, securities or property" given up by it in acquiring the property. Thus, assum-
ing this proviso is satisfied, a cash basis taxpayer (e.g., a bank) which acquires another such
taxpayer by merger, or on a tax-free intercorporate liquidation of its subsidiary, would be en-
titled to the entire real property tax deduction both for the current year and any prior years
when it later pays the taxes on the real property so acquired. Section 381 was enacted at the
same time as § 164(d). In contrast, § 164(d) would, if applied to the successor corporation,
allow deduction only for the current year's tax, and then only a pro rata portion thereof. This
rather dearly indicates that the term "sold" in § 164 (d) was not intended to apply to such non-
taxable transactions as are expressly dealt with by 5 381.
82. From time to time, there have been complaints about the volume of matters upon which
the Internal Revenue Service is requested to issue private rulings. It seems dear that to a large
extent such requests are prompted by the Services failure to resolve in the regulations ambigu-
ities which may exist in the code. Failure of Treas. Reg. § 1.164-6 (a) to mention "exchanges"
could hardly have been oversight since the regulations were promulgated in final form on
October 7, 1957, some eighteen months after the decision in Simon J. Murphy v. Commis-
sioner, 231 F.2d 639 (6th Cir. 1956). See also discussion in note 80 supra.
83. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 164(d).
84. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.164-6(b) (2), (3) (1959), Example 2. By permitting the purchaser
this option, the Service takes the view that the rule of § 164(d) (2) was not intended to be
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cash basis seller in Ohio when "the tax is not payable until after the
date of sale."8 5  No similar provision exists for cases where the sale
occurs during or after the time the tax is payable. In such cases, it
would appear necessary for the cash basis seller actually to pay the
tax if it is payable at the date of sale. 6
There is a still more basic question involved from the viewpoint
of the cash basis seller in Ohio. The code specifically provides for
constructive payment by one party, where the other party to the sale
was either personally liable for the tax or was the owner when the
tax became a lien on the property. Where, as in Ohio, there is no
personal liability for the tax and it becomes a lien on January 1st, the
first day of the real property tax year, the purchaser (the "other
party" to the sale) is never liable and never the owner on lien day. 7
Literally, therefore, the code does not provide for constructive pay-
ment by a cash basis seller in Ohio. As noted, the regulations wisely
remedy this omission. No reason appears why, pending an appro-
priate amendment to the statute, taxpayers may not rely upon these
regulations.
Constructive Accrual of the Tax
Where the seller uses an accrual method of accounting, no par-
ticular problem arises in regard to the Ohio real property tax. Even
under prior law he was assured of a deduction, since the tax accrued
on January 1st.88 That rule remains in effect, but the code limits the
amount deductible by him to the prorated amount.8 9 However, the
accrual basis purchaser in Ohio requires, and is afforded, relief. If
he has not elected to accrue real property taxes ratably over the real
property tax year, then his pro rata portion of the Ohio real prop-
erty tax for the year of purchase is deemed to accrue on the date of
the sale. 90 If he has elected to accrue real property taxes ratably,
then the portion of the Ohio real property tax for the year of pur-
exclusive. The latter section, by its terms, requires that the taxpayer be treated as having paid
his portion of the tax "on the date of sale" and gives no option. The option to claim it either
in the year of sale or in a later taxable year permits the purchaser to claim the deduction in
whichever year will afford him the greater tax benefit.
85. Treas. Reg. § 1.164-6(d) (1), (4), Example 1. Presumably, "payable" contemplates
that time when the seller can actually make payment of the tax, i.e., when the County Treas-
urer's books are actually open for collection in Ohio, rather than the collection periods con-
templated by the Ohio Revised Code. Accordingly, the regulation giving the option to the
cash basis seller will cover the vast majority of cases in Ohio.
86. It is theoretically possible for the sale to occur between December 21st, after the first
half collection has closed, and December 31st.
87. This will be true except when the sale occurs on New Year's Day. In that case, the
question is moot because proration is not required under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 164(d).
88. Magruder v. Supplee, 316 U.S. 394 (1942).
89. This is true under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 164(d) (1), whether he treats the tax as
accruing in full on January 1st or has elected under § 461 (c) to accrue it ratably over the real
property tax year.
90. Under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 164(d) (2) (D).
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chase prorated to, and treated as imposed upon him presumably is
allowable as a deduction ratably over the portion of the real property
tax year during which he owned the property. 1
Effect of Proration Upon the Seller's Income or Loss
As noted above, the code 92 provides that in computing gain or
loss on the transaction, the seller's proceeds of sale shall exclude any
amounts received as reimbursement from the purchaser for the por-
tion of real property taxes treated as imposed upon the purchaser.
If "reimbursement" is given its commonly accepted meaning, this will
rarely apply to Ohio transactions.93  The statute also provides that
the seller's proceeds shall include the portion of real property taxes
treated as imposed upon the seller, if such taxes are to be paid by
the purchaser. As shown below, this must be interpreted as provid-
ing by implication that the purchaser's portion of the tax shall not
be included in the seller's proceeds. Where the sale and the January
1st accrual date fall within the same taxable year of the seller (either
because he uses the calendar year or because the sale occurs within
the same fiscal year of the seller during which the entire tax accrued),
no income arises for the seller because of the proration of part of the
tax to the purchaser. In such cases, the reduction in the seller's ac-
crual because of the sale occurs within the same taxable year of the
seller and is simply a wash. However, where the seller's fiscal year
ends after the January 1st accrual date for the tax and before the
date of sale, a problem for the seller arises from the fact that the
entire tax accrued in one of his fiscal years and the sale of the prop-
erty (with its consequent reduction in the amount deductible by him)
occurs in the seller's subsequent fiscal year. In the latter case, the
seller has ordinary income in the later year equal to the amount of
tax treated as imposed on the purchaser,9 4 unless the deduction for
real property taxes in the prior fiscal year gave him no income tax
benefit.95
Effect of Proration Upon the Purchaser's Cost
The purchaser's tax situation is fairly well correlated with that
of the seller. Any portion of the real property tax deemed imposed
91. Neither the regulations under § 164(d) nor under § 4 61(c) are explicit on this point,
but it would seem necessarily to follow. The election under 5 461 (c) will actually make a dif-
ference only where the taxpayer uses a fiscal year which ends after the date of purchase. In
such cases, the whole of the tax deemed imposed upon the purchaser would accrue in the prior
fiscal year in the absence of election under § 461 (c). But where there is such an election, the
deduction is split between the two fiscal years which the real property tax year overlaps.
92. INT. Ri .COD OF 1954, S 1001(b).
93. It will apply only in those cases where the sale occurs during or after the collection period
for Ohio real property taxes and where the seller has paid the full amount of the tax for the
year of sale.
94. Treas. Reg. § 1.164-6(d) (5) (1959).
95. Under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 111.
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upon the purchaser cannot be added to his cost of the property.96
But he is entitled to add to his cost the portion of the real property
tax deemed imposed upon the seller. 7 For example, assume that the
property is purchased on March 31, 1959, and the Ohio real property
tax for the year is $1,200. Under the principles explained above,
25 o of that amount ($300) is deemed to be imposed upon the seller
and 75% ($900) upon the purchaser. Under Ohio law, the tax for
1959 was not payable on March 31st. Assume that the purchaser
uses the cash method and files his return on the calendar year basis.
If he pays the entire $1,200 tax on December 20, 1959, he is entitled
to deduct only $900 for 1959.98 If the purchaser assumed the entire
tax and the parties made no proration by contract, the seller would
still be entitled to deduct $300 of the tax. If the selling price of the
property without proration of the real property tax for 1959 was
$30,000, the purchaser would add the $300 (the seller's portion of
the tax) to the $30,000 which he pays to the seller, and the seller
would include that amount in his proceeds of sale in addition to the
$30,000 actually received from the purchaser.9 Thus, the seller
would be regarded as having sold for $30,300 and the purchaser's
cost basis would be $30,300.
In actual practice, the parties usually will prorate the tax by con-
tract. Since this is frequently made at a time when the amount of
the tax for the year of sale is unknown and unknowable, the agreed
proration is commonly based upon the prior year's valuation and
rates as a matter of necessity. This may, but frequently will not,
be the same as the actual amount of the tax for the year of sale, and
more likely will, in these times of increased rates and assessed valua-
tions, be less than the actual tax. At the same time, the federal in-
come tax consequences to the parties are based upon the actual tax for
the year of sale, regardless of whether, or how, the contract of the
parties requires the economic burden of the tax to be shared. The
difference between the agreed proration and that made for federal
income tax purposes is reflected in the proceeds to the seller and the
purchaser's cost. Thus, in the example above, assume that the parties
prorate the real property tax for 1959 based upon 1958 taxes of
$1,000. In this case, the seller would receive, and the purchaser
would pay, $29,750 (i.e., $30,000 less 25 % of $1,000 tax prorated
to the seller) upon the purchaser's assuming the 1959 taxes. For in-
come tax purposes, the seller would be regarded as having received
on the sale $30,050 (i.e., the $29,750 actually received plus the $300
96. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1012 expressly so provides.
97. Under the general principle that cost includes pre-existing liens subject to which the
property is acquired, the entire tax would be added to the cost.
98. Assuming he so elects. See discussion, p. 171.
99. Under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1001 (b) (2). If it were not so interpreted, the seller
would be regarded as having sold for a price higher than that for which the purchaser is re-
garded as having bought it.
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of the 1959 tax prorated to him), and he will be able to take
a $300 deduction for 1959 real property taxes; the purchaser would
have a cost basis of $30,050 for the property. Thus, the net result is
that the economic benefit of $50, which the seller reaped as a result
of the agreed proration's being less than that required for income tax
purposes, is reflected in both the seller's proceeds of sale and the pur-
chaser's cost of the property. Where (hasten the day) the Ohio real
property taxes decline, so that the proration by contract is based upon
higher taxes than actually obtain for the year of sale, the economic
benefit to the purchaser will be reflected in diminished proceeds of
sale to the seller and a reduction in the purchaser's cost basis.00
There is one additional problem which may pose difficulty for the
purchaser of Ohio real property. When a cash basis purchaser elects
under Ohio law to pay the tax in installments, it will sometimes occur
that one installment is paid within one taxable year (whether calen-
dar or fiscal) and the other installment is paid in the subsequent tax-
able year of the purchaser. Under the principles herein discussed,
the purchaser is not entitled to deduct more than his pro rata share
and the question arises as to how that share should be reflected in
the installments. To illustrate, take the same example as assumed
above, but assume further that the purchaser decides to pay the tax in
installments, one-half ($600) on December 20, 1959, and the other
half during 1960. Should he treat only $300 of the first installment
and all of the second installment as payment of his tax; or all of the
first installment and only $300 of the second installment as payment
of his tax; or $450 (75 %5) of each installment as payment of his
tax? Since two of his taxable years are affected, the tax result could
depend upon which of these three possibilities is the proper one. As
noted above, the code would require the cash basis purchaser to de-
duct the $900 in 1959, the year of purchase, regardless of when
actually paid. The regulations, giving the purchaser the option to
deduct it when it is later paid, are completely silent as to what the
purchaser should do in the type of case assumed. It seems probable
that the Service will allow the purchaser to treat the installment pay-
ments as he wishes.' 01
Ohio Tangible Personal Property Taxes
Many purchases of real property also involve purchase of ap-
purtenant or related items which are classified as personal property
100. Unfortunately, the regulations do not make these matters dear by examples showing
the result where the parties prorate the tax by contract on a basis different from that required
by § 164(d) of the code.
101. It would appear inconsistent for the Service to allow the cash basis purchaser the flexi-
bility permitted by Treas. Reg. § 1.164-6(d) (a) (1959) as to time of the deduction, but to
deny him this additional flexibility.
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for Ohio tax purposes."' 2 There is no provision in the federal in-
come tax law requiring proration of personal property taxes similar
to those discussed above relating to real property taxes. 10 3 While pro-
ration by contract is the almost invariable practice for real property
taxes, similar proration of Ohio personal property taxes is rare, even
though the purchaser in some cases receives a benefit from the per-
sonal property taxes paid or incurred by the seller.
The Ohio tangible personal property tax is, like the Ohio real
property tax, imposed for the calendar year.0 4 The person who
owns tangible personalty used in trade or business on tax-listing day
is personally liable for the tax. 10 5 For calendar year taxpayers, tax-
listing day is December 31st of the year preceding that for which the
tax is imposed; 10 6 for taxpayers using a fiscal year ending April 30th
or before, tax-listing day is the last day of the fiscal year ending with-
in the year for which the tax is imposed;.0 7 and for taxpayers using a
fiscal year ending after April 30th, tax-listing day is the last day of
the fiscal year ending during the year preceding that for which the
tax is imposed.0 8 For a taxpayer who engages in business in Ohio
for the first time, tangible personal property must be listed as of the
date he first engages in business in Ohio. But he is not required to
list such property if he establishes that the same has already been
listed or assessed in Ohio for the same calendar year. 0 9 It is in the
latter case where proration by agreement may be proper, since the
purchaser may obtain a benefit from the tax paid by the seller for
the same year.
That benefit, however, may not be obtainable in all cases. Where
the seller and the purchaser use different accounting years, the prop-
erty may or may not be exempt as to the purchaser, depending upon
whether the property has been listed or assessed for that same per-
sonal property tax year."0  Where the seller and the purchaser use
the same accounting year, calendar or fiscal, the purchaser may be
benefited by reason of the seller's liability for the tax.
In cases where the purchaser is benefited, the seller should give
102. See, e.g., Zangerle v. Standard Oil Co., 144 Ohio St. 506, 60 N.E.2d 52 (1945); Na-
tional Tube Co., 45 Ohio Op. 358 (B.T.A. 1950). See also Ohio Tax Commissioner's Rule
19-26, as amended July 8, 1958.
103. It would appear that § 164 (d) of the code will apply where, as in Pennsylvania, personal
property is in some circumstances taxed as part of the real property. See PA. STAT. ANN. Tit.
72 §§ 5020-201 (Supp. 1958).
104. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Peck, 1 C.C.H. Ohio Tax Cas. 10,741 (B.T.A. 1953).
105. OHIO REV. CODE § 5711.08.
106. OHIO REV. CODE § 5711.03.
107. OHIO REV. CODE § 5711.10; Ohio Tax Commissioner's Rule No. 202.
108. Ibid.
109. OHIO REV. CODE § 5711.03.
110. David J. Joseph Co. v. Evart, 32 Ohio Op. 55 (B.T.A. 1945) (calendar year purchaser
not entitled to the benefit of taxes paid by a seller using a May 31st fiscal year where purchased
after May 31st).
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consideration to including in the contract of sale a proration of the
Ohio tangible personal property taxes for the year during which the
property is sold. The seller will invariably obtain an income tax de-
duction for such taxes whether the seller uses an accrual method of
accounting (since he incurred personal liability therefor on listing
day"') or uses the cash method and later pays the taxes. Disposi-
tion of the property after listing day does not vitiate his liability for
the tax." 2 Any increase in price for the property which he charges
the purchaser on account of this benefit merely increases his realiza-
tion on the sale" 3 and correspondingly increases the purchaser's de-
preciable cost basis for the property.
In short, in those cases where Ohio tangible personal property
taxes are prorated by agreement of the parties, the federal income
tax consequences are generally the same as those which resulted upon
proration of Ohio real property taxes prior to 1954. It would ap-
pear that Ohio practitioners have seriously neglected this area where
proration by contract can yield a substantial tax benefit to the seller.
111. I.T. 2632, XI-2 CUM. BULL. 74 (1932); G.C4. 8218, IX-2 CUM. BULL. 106 (1930);
Rev. Rul. 616, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 305; Faultless Rubber Co., 5 P-H Tax. Ct. Mem. 212
(1936).
112. Omo lRnv. CODE § 5711.03.
113. Generally taxable to the seller as capital gain under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1231.
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